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Abstract
In this Chapter, I will explore the use of modeling in order to under-
stand how Science works. I will discuss the modeling of scientific commu-
nities, providing a general, non-comprehensive overview of existing mod-
els, with a focus on the use of the tools of Agent-Based Modeling and
Opinion Dynamics. A special attention will be paid to models inspired by
a Bayesian formalism of Opinion Dynamics. The objective of this explo-
ration is to better understand the effect that different conditions might
have on the reliability of the opinions of a scientific community. We will
see that, by using artificial worlds as exploring grounds, we can prevent
some epistemological problems with the definition of truth and obtain
insights on the conditions that might cause the quest for more reliable
knowledge to fail.
1 Introduction
The classical description of the work of a scientist is one that many of us would
like to believe true. According to it, scientists are as close as reasonably possible
to believe to selfless individuals who pursue knowledge using always the best
means available to them. They propose hypothesis and theories according to
what they feel would describe all relevant data better. And, from those models,
they draw predictions that are tested under very strict conditions. Finally, still
according to our idealized view, it is the agreement between observations and
those predictions that dictate which theories are better accepted. Conditions
of beauty, like simplicity and symmetry, can be invoked when deciding between
equally well suited theories, depending on who is telling the tale. But that is it,
and no other considerations should be included.
Obviously, the real life is not so simple and scientists do defend their own
ideas because it is their own or because they like it better. And, as in any human
activity, one will find individuals whose agenda is based only in self-interest.
However, as long as community moves in the right direction and eventually
corrects any mistakes, we could, in principle, consider these problems as just
perturbations to an otherwise reasonably precise description of the scientific
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enterprise. In particular, the amazing advances of knowledge in many areas,
where old ideas have been replaced by newer and better ones, seems to lend a lot
of credit to that idealized description. At the very least, as a good approximation
for the system as a whole, even if it fails in individual cases.
And, indeed, we do have controls to avoid the more serious problems. Repli-
cation (or reproducibility) [27, 69, 56] is considered fundamental by most and
with good reason. Once an independent researcher obtains the same results,
chances of error in the first report are obviously smaller. But, most important
of all, if the groups are truly independent and the second group has nothing
to gain from either a positive or a negative result, the chances that the first
group published fraudulent results basically disappear. This makes the problem
of self-serving scientists much less important than it might otherwise be. It also
points out to another central feature of the scientific endeavor that is sometimes
neglected. That is, the social aspect of Science.
As in many human activities, the outcomes of scientific research are nowa-
days a social product of a community of scientists. Theory and measurement
are often done by different individuals, except in cases where just a fact, a
simple idea, or a property of some material or drug are tested. Even in these
cases, there is often a group behind the results, as many fields have become
so complex that the expertise of many different researchers is often needed.
Main examples of this are the ”Big Science” projects, such as the mapping of
the human genome or the hunt for the Higgs boson. You have different people
taking care of different aspects of the problem, some building the equipments,
others operating them, a group specializing in collecting the data, more people
to store it properly, others to interpret it and so on. Even in smaller projects,
like a simple simulation that one can program alone, we often use software de-
veloped by a third party, software we trust to do what we are told it does. We
depend on the quality of the information and work performed by others in most
of the research done nowadays. And, while it might be reasonable, under some
circumstances, to assume that most of the information we use were produced
in a competent and honest way, it is certain that we can not claim it for all
the information[9, 10]. Despite what we are taught in school, arguments of au-
thority are actually unavoidable [28] and we have to understand the effects this
might have.
As soon as we realize that we have come to depend on the results of others
even to make our own research, we have to realize we might risk running into
epistemic trouble. While it is clear that some social aspects are clearly positive
(as, obviously, replication), social influence could lead some people away from
the best answer. That means that understanding which social aspects can help
the reliability of a result and which ones are more likely to be detrimental is
an important task. And we must acknowledge that there are different accounts
of the scientific process that do not describe it in such beautiful collors, like,
per example, the Strong Program in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge [3,
72, 48, 5]. That program defends that Science is just another human social
activity. And, as such, not more reliable than any other descriptions of the
world obtained by other methods. While scientific advances seem to contradict
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that in a very strong way, one must admit that some of the criticism might be
correct and that there might be ways to make the whole scientific activity even
more reliable and less prone to error. In a time where no single human can
check the correctness of his whole field alone, understanding the consequences
of social interaction and errors can be fundamental to the future quality of the
Science we will make.
Furthermore, there are fields in which published results have been consis-
tently shown to be wrong[38, 4, 78], exactly due to the way the Science and
publications are structured. Biases towards publishing only some types of re-
sults exist and are very prejudicial. It is also already known that replication is
a far less common practice than it would be expected in areas as different as
Marketing [35, 18] and Medicine [37]. These findings make it very clear that
it is imperative that we study and understand well the effects of how the way
Science is structured and how scientists interact might affect the quality of our
conclusions.
Of course, trying to figure how reliable an answer is or if we can really say
we know something about the world is an old philosophical problem that we
will not answer so simply. However, the question of reliability of results might
be particularly well suited to be analyzed with the tools of simulation and
agent based models. Simulating a community of scientists will not answer the
deepest problems of Skepticism [44]. However, if we assume that it is possible
to know something about the world, agent based models of Science can help us
explore which strategies and behaviors are more likely to cause problems or to
get us closer to the best answers. This happens not only because we can explore
unforeseen consequences of interaction rules that we wouldn’t see in models built
using just human language, but also because we can, as programmers, choose
which theory is the best one in the artificial world of our agents. And therefore,
in principle, check the effects of different social structures on the choice of the
best theory. Of course, any limitations that apply to current models of social
interaction will apply here fully and the results must be analyzed with the typical
doubt we associate with tentative new ideas. But we can get some advice on
where it might be more likely that a change in current practices will lead to
better outcomes.
1.1 Existing models for describing scientific practices
In this paper, I defend one specific use for agent models, one that has seen a
small number of papers up to now. However, it is interesting to acknowledge that
the applications of computational and mathematical modeling to communities
of scientists is an area that has been seen a steady increase in the interest and
number of papers. Different researchers have dedicated themselves to different
problems, most of them tending towards describing the society of scientists.
Therefore, it makes sense to provide a very brief and very incomplete review of
those applications. Those works can be divided in three major areas: methods
to measure the quality and impact of a scientist work; studies of the structure
of Science, as per example, the networks of authors and their papers; and the
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modeling of knowledge, either just looking at its difusion, or at the acceptance
of new and better knowledge. It is particularly worth noting that recently, there
was a full edition of the Journal of Artificial Societies And Social Simulation
[15] as well as a book [79], both dedicated to simulation of Science.
Measuring the impact of the work of each of us can be an important task.
It has significant influence on our careers and scientific policy makers could
use such this information when deciding how to divide the funding [93]. It
is no surprise therefore that attempts at providing quantitative measurements
for the relevance of a scientist work have become popular and several different
proposals now exist. They include the now unavoidable (despite the biases it
introduces) H-index [32], initially proposed to avoid the problems of measure-
ment brought by total number of citations, that could be a very large number
even if the scientist had just collaborated in one very well cited article. Several
other measurements were also proposed [16, 23] and many others are proba-
bly being investigated. One interesting aspect of the problem that still needs
to be addressed, however, is the impact these indexes have in scientific pro-
duction. Scientists are usually reasonably intelligent individuals and, therefore,
they might change the way they work in order to have better values at the
measurement they are evaluated with, instead of worrying only about making
better Science.
On the evolution of scientific fields, the ability to measure and quantify
production can be both important and interesting in itself [17]. The existence
of big databases of published material has allowed a large number of studies on
structure that is formed by articles and researchers. There are models describing
the networks that are formed when scientists cite others [24, 6, 76, 75, 77] as
well as the networks of co-authorship [66, 65, 2], and even of articles connected
by the same specific area [31]. This mapping effort allows us to have a much
clearer view of how Science is done. Also, the existence of these studies and the
data they are based on provides us with indirect measures of social influences
among researchers. A complete agent model of scientific activities should either
use or explain the structures that were observed; however, we are still far from
obtaining such a model, the same way that we are far from having a really
reliable and complete model of how people influence each other choices in any
field of human behavior. Existing models, as we will see, are still simplistic
versions built to address just a few questions and not really general enough.
Still, more recent years have seen the appearance of the first models of idea
diffusion in scientific communities, including approaches that make use of the
Master equation [45] and population dynamics [92] instead of agent models.
Among the agent models, several just try to describe the statistical features
observed in the studies that measured number of papers and how they are
connected by proposing simple rules of influence [26, 82, 83, 67] such as, per
example, copying the citations of read papers. Attempts at introducing more
sophisticated agents, with better cognition, also exist [63]. Many general ideas
not completely developed have also been proposed as possible basis for future
models [12, 70, 71], including general ideas about the practice inspired by the
works of philosophers of Science[14].
4
Of particular interest to the view defended here are models for the diffu-
sion of ideas and opinions that try to answer whether our current practices
are good enough or whether we should work to change some of them. One
first model used the Bounded Confidence model [11, 29] of Opinion Dynamics
[8, 21, 87, 29, 19, 54, 60] as basis, exploring if agents would approach a true
value of a parameter given that some of the agents were truth-seekers, who had
a tendency to move towards the correct result [30]. However, by adopting a
purely continuous version of opinion, that model, while very interesting, is not
enough to describe the choice of theories. The effects of peer review [84, 86] were
also suggested as an important field to explore by the use of models, since many
of the proposals for change in the peer review process have not been explored
wit the necessary depth. In the same line, discussions of the possible use of
modelling to make Science more reliable already exist [94]. However, a strong
push forward in developing these models is still to be observed.
Another promissing line of investigation on the reliability of Science is the
study of the effects of the existence of agents who make claims that are stronger
than the actual observations warrant. The main question explored there is if this
type of lie could help in the convincing of general public[20, 22]. Finally, I have
also proposed a model to explore acceptance of better theories [59], one that
was able to show that the idea that Science advances thanks to the retirement
of old scientists [46] might be true. In the Section 3, we will discuss it and I will
show why I believe it can provide the basis for a more sophisticated and maybe
even a little less artificial description of the scientific enterprise. That study was
based on an Opinion Dynamics model that distinguishes choices and strength
of opinion[54, 55] and is also based on notions of rationality. A model working
on the same problem, where actual publications were introduced as the means
that scientists use to communicate their results was also recently proposed with
some very promissing results [85].
2 Epistemology and Modelling
Before presenting a model, it makes sense to discuss a few issues regarding
the aplicability of mathematical and computational modeling to the epistemic
problem of finding better ways to obtain reliable knowledge. The first question
worth mentioning, but too complex to be discussed properly here, is exactly the
meaning of knowing [80]. Traditional accounts define that one knows something
when the person has a justified true believe about that something, but there
are known problems with that definition [25].
As mentioned above, one interesting feature of artificial worlds is that, since
the programmer is playing the part of a creator god, we can circumvent, for
the agents, any of the arguments of Skepticism about the possibility of knowing
something about the world. Even softer skeptical arguments, like the problem
of induction [36, 33] can be either dismissed by constructing a world where the
rules don’t change, or, eventually, one could investigate what would happen if
the future did not exactly follow the same laws as the past. By controlling
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the laws of the artificial universe, different scenarios and their impact on the
learning of the agents can be much better investigated than in the real world,
where we can only know our theories, but not be always certain about which
of them are really better. Of course, this means developping better models for
the dynamics of scientific opinions, but the possibility that those models can be
quite helpful at exploring epistemic problems should be clear.
In the next Section, I will describe a model that I believe has the potential
to be built upon so that we can arrive at a more realistic description of the
problem. But, before that, it is good to debate the fundamental ideas behind
it and how they relate to current developments in Epistemology. One line of
reasoning in Epistemology claims that all we can really know about the world
are probabilities that our ideas are correct. When making any new observation,
those probabilities must change according to what we have learn, by obeying the
Bayes Theorem. This idea can be called Bayesian Epistemology [41, 42, 7, 88].
This is a normative theory, in the sense that it claims that this is the best
way to make inferences, and not necessarily the way we actually perform them.
The claim that scientist behave and choose the theories they support in a way
similar to the specifications of Bayesian methods is known in Philosophy as
Confirmation Theory [13, 39, 40, 34, 49, 7]. While it is known that humans
are actually bad probabilists [73], there is some evidence that scientists do not
deviate so much from a Bayesian point of view [74]. Interestingly, not only
scientists, but there is a growing body of evidence that the way people reason
about problems and theories is actually close to Bayesian analysis [89, 43], if not
exactly so. The so-called error in human probabilistic reasoning can actually
be explained by assuming that our brains work with more complex models of
reality than what was supposed in the laboratory tests [50, 52].
Therefore, we can use Bayesian models as basis for the behavior of our
agents [53], even if only as a reasonable first aproximation. Such an approach
has already produced a number of Opinion Dynamics models [1, 68, 47, 54, 55,
57, 91, 62, 81, 58, 59, 61, 60] and it was also used to show why a non-specialized
reader should only come to trust a scientific model in cases where there might
be errors and deception from the part of the authors, when the results are
replicated by a third party [51, 69, 56].
3 A Model for the spread of a new theory
Assume each agent must choose between two theories, A and B. This choice is
a discrete choice between those alternatives, but agents can have a strenght of
opinion, represented by the probability pi that each artificial scientist i assigns to
the possibility that A is the best description. If pi > 0.5, agent i believes A is the
best option, otherwise, it is B. This model is basically the “Continuous Opinions
and Discrete Actions” model (CODA model), previously used to explore the
emergence of extremism in artificial societies [54, 55]. CODA is based on the
idea that agents believe that, if A is the best choice, each of the neighbors of an
agent, located in a given social network [64, 90], will have a probability α > 0.5
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of choosing A(and similarly, for B). In this context, it is easier to work with a
transformation of variables, given by the quantity
νi = ln
pi
1− pi
.
Here, if νi > 0, we have pi > 0.5 and, therefore, a subjective belief in favor of
A; if νi < 0, the agent chooses B. By applying Bayes Theorem, we obtain a
very simple update rule for νi, when agent i observes the choice of its neighbor
j, given by
νi(t+ 1) = νi(t) + sign(νj) ∗ a,
where a is a step size that depends on how likely the agents believe it is that
their neighbors will be correct, that is, it is a function of α. If we renormalize
the update rule, by using ν∗i = νi/a instead, we will have
ν∗i (t+ 1) = ν
∗
i (t) + sign(ν
∗
j ), (1)
making it clear that the value of a is irrelevant to the dynamics of choices,
since that dynamics depends only on the signs of νi (or ν
∗
i ). The update of the
opinions is asynchronous.
In order to introduce the influence of observations in this problem, a pro-
portion τ of the scientists actually perform experiments. This experiments can
have a stronger or weaker influence on this agents, measured by the probabil-
ity ρ and experimenter will, at each interaction, observe the Nature, instead of
being influenced by a neighbor. In here, we assume experiments always provide
the same answer, agreeing with A and that the agenbt will update its opinion
by the same amount it would from an interaction with a neighbor. Notice that
a stronger effect can easily be introduced simply by allowing ρ to be larger and
that means no new parameter needs to be introduced here.
It was observed that, unless τ is reasonably large, even when experimen-
talists are very weakly influenced by social effects (ρ close to 1.0), they fail to
convince the whole population and clusters of agents preferring the worst the-
ory survive. This effect was particularly strong when theory A was new and,
therefore, started with a small proportion of supporters, indicating that the old
view would survive simply from social effects and the strength of opinion of its
old supporters. Interestingly, when retirement was introduced in the system,
with agents replaced by new ones with moderate initial opinions, it became
much easier for new and better ideas to invade, confirming Kuhn’s notion that
Science would advance and accept new paradigms due to the death of the old
scientists [46].
Of course, those results were obtained with a very simplified version of the
scientific activity. This was intentional, in the old Physics tradition of starting
at the very simplest model one can imagine and later add new features, as they
become needed. The idea is to understand which details are responsible for
which features of the whole problem. As such, expanding the model from its
several approximations is a natural next step. Per example, in the model, social
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Figure 1: Proportion of agents aligned with the external field (correct scientists)
as a function of ρ. Every realization had initial conditions where each agent had
50% chance of supporting either theory. The solid line corresponds to λ = 0.0,
the dashed one to λ = 0.1, the dotted one to λ = 0.25, and the dash-dotted
one to λ = 0.5. (Left panel) τ = 25%. (Middle panel) τ = 50%. (Right panel)
τ = 75%.
influence happened only between peers and they were all located on a non-
realistic square lattice. No publications existed in the model and Nature always
gave the same answer, meaning one theory was clearly superior to the other.
And, while people would reinforce their ideas given a certain neighborhood,
all agents were supposed to be honest, in the sense that they would always
choose the theory they really believed more likely to be truth. Despite all this,
the model is very easy to expand. By changing the likelihoods agents assign
to the choices of others, we could introduce more realistic versions of social
influence. Researchers could do papers, adding a new layer to the problem, and
the quality of those papers could depend on the correctness of their argument.
And, of course, more realistic networks can be trivially introduced.
In order to illustrate these differences, new cases for small-world networks
were run specifically for this paper. The results are shown in Figure 1. All
cases shown correspond to a initial square lattice with 322 agents, where each
link was randomly rewired with probability λ. Each point is the result of the
average of 10 diferent realizations of the same problem and the bars correspond
to the standard deviation of the observed values. Initial conditions were such
that at first both theories had equal amount of support and the system was left
to interact for t = 200 average interactions per agent. Each panel shows the
results for different values of λ for a specific proportion τ of experimenters. We
can see that as the small-world effect becomes more important (larger rewiring
λ), it becomes easier for the system to reach agreement on the best theory.
However, the problem with the continuing existence of groups supporting the
worse theory remains for the cases where the importance of experiment is not
large enough, confirming, at least, qualitatively, the results previously obtained.
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4 Conclusion
We have seen that mathematical and computational modeling of scientific agents
can be used as a tool to help us understand under which conditions scientific
results are more reliable. While it is quite true that the models so far proposed
are very simple, we have seen that they can already capture some of the features
of the scientific enterprise, such as the need for solid and reliable experimental
data. If experiments are not very convincing, we would be in the situation
where ρ is small and, therefore, social influence can indeed become the major
force in the system, as suggested in the Strong Prgram. However, as soon as
experiments become more important and we have a better connected world, the
case for the better theory becomes strong enough to convince everyone. We
should also notice that the same model was able to show the importance of the
retirement of scientists, as a way to allow new better ideas to spread more easily.
As such, I would like to encourage the modeling community to investigate
models for scientific activity. And by that I mean not only from the sociological
(and also interesting) point of view of measuring our activities, but also from
the point of view of suggesting better practices. While doubt will remain when
a suggestion comes from a model, the tools we have make the exploration of the
consequences more reliable than simple human intuition and spoken arguments.
Models of Science can and should help us make research an even better tool for
understanding the world.
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